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The Renaissance of the Renaissance Man? 
Specialists vs. Generalists in Teams of Inventors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Is there a role for the multifaceted Renaissance Man in modern team-intensive innovation 
activities? This paper argues that researchers with broad knowledge, also known as generalists, 
make an especially valuable contribution to innovation teams. Given the re-combinative nature of 
technological progress, innovation results depend crucially on the skilful matching of different 
pieces of knowledge. The presence of generalists in innovation teams makes the knowledge 
recombination process more effective, even if this comes at the cost of reduced knowledge depth. 
Moreover, typical barriers in team processes become less acute with the presence of generalists. We 
analyze the role of generalists versus specialists in innovation teams by tracking the trajectories of 
inventors in the electrical and electronics industry through their patenting activity. Our findings 
suggest that innovation teams with the contribution of generalists outperform those that rely on a 
diverse set of specialists. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern research activities are mostly, and increasingly, organized in teams. As Wutchy et al. 
(2007) report, the majority of scientific papers and about half of the patents nowadays are co-
authored and co-invented, respectively. Jones (2009) argues that the increasing use of teamwork in 
innovation activities is the consequence of the growing specialization of innovators. According to 
this view, the large stock of knowledge that has to be learnt in each discipline makes it increasingly 
costly to master several areas of knowledge. The result is that ―Renaissance Men‖, i.e. people who 
excel at multiple disciplines, are extremely scarce. In contrast, the majority of innovators are deep 
specialists in constricted areas, who frequently need to work in teams with other specialists to cover 
the relevant technological space needed to develop increasingly complex innovations. One question 
arises naturally as an objection to this perspective: to what extent are teams of specialists able to 
collaborate effectively in the development of innovations?  
In this paper, we develop the idea of a ―new‖ Renaissance Man, i.e. an innovator who 
chooses to have broad instead of deep knowledge and who is crucially valuable in teams of 
inventors. We build our theory based on three arguments. First, given the re-combinative nature of 
innovation, we suggest that a researcher does not need to master the knowledge of any given area to 
be able to innovate (contrary to Jones (2009) assumption). Instead, he can trade off depth for 
breadth and become a generalist innovator who is knowledgeable in different areas without 
reaching the frontier of knowledge in all of them. Second, we posit that knowledge variety is a very 
valuable asset in the recombination of knowledge. Third, teams of inventors that gather field 
specialists to obtain the necessary knowledge variety suffer from a series of coordination and 
motivation problems during the innovation process. We argue that the presence of generalists in 
teams of inventors helps to attenuate or to avoid these problems. Hence, our main prediction is that, 
all else equal, teams of inventors that include generalists will outperform teams of inventors that 
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combine only specialists. They will produce more relevant innovations and, because of their 
particular advantage in the knowledge recombination process, more original ones1.  
Even though teams of inventors are arguably the most relevant type of creative teams for 
social and economic development, very little is known about how they are organized at firms and 
how this affects their productivity. The innovation literature has typically examined innovation at 
the firm and, more recently, at the individual level—mainly from a network perspective—but not at 
the team level. To our knowledge, the only exception is Fleming and Singh (2010), who analyze the 
productivity of teams of inventors versus that of lone inventors. From the sociology literature, we 
have some insights on how the within-team interactions among members (i.e. a team‘s internal 
social capital) affect the productivity of R&D teams (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001).  
On the other hand, the organizational behavior literature has extensively analyzed the effect 
of team-level knowledge variety on team performance (Harrison and Klein, 2007)2. This literature 
associates high knowledge variety at the team level with the potential to recombine ideas that lead 
to highly creative results (Jackson et al., 1995; Paulus 2000; Taylor and Greve, 2006) but also with 
motivation and communication problems that damage team performance (Stewart and Stasser, 
1995; Gigone and Hastie, 1997; Jehn et al., 1999). Nevertheless, this strand of literature has not 
dealt with the way in which team-level variety is achieved. Knowledge variety in teams may stem 
from two sources: either the team consists only of specialists from different technological areas or it 
includes one or more generalists. In the first case, each of the team members has a certain level of 
expertise in a field that is unfamiliar to the rest of teammates. In the second case, one or more of the 
                                                             
1 Note that there are many aspects contributing to efficiency gains from the use of teams that do not relate 
to knowledge specialization. Therefore, the accurate way to test the performance of teams of specialized 
inventors is to compare them with similar-sized teams achieving a similar level of knowledge variety through 
the inclusion of some generalist member(s), not with lone generalist inventors.  
2
 Following Harrison and Klein (2007), we use the term “knowledge variety” to refer to the diversity in the 
pieces of knowledge held by a team. 
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members of the team have a multidisciplinary background that accounts for a large part of the 
knowledge variety in the team. To our knowledge, this topic has been addressed only by Rulke and 
Galaskiewicz (2000), who looked at the composition of teams of MBA students performing 
business simulation games. The authors find that teams formed of students, each of whom has 
experience in several functional areas, outperform teams whose members are specialized in one 
functional area each3. The focus of Rulke and Galaskiewicz (2000) on (simulated) managerial 
decision-making, however, makes their findings difficult to extrapolate to teams engaged in 
knowledge generation.  
This paper contributes to the literature on how team composition affects innovation results 
by suggesting that innovation teams including members with broad knowledge outperform those 
combining field specialists. We test our arguments using patent data. This data is useful to identify 
teams of inventors responsible for the creation of innovations and measure their performance. 
Moreover, in patent-intensive sectors such as the electrical and electronics industry (Hall, 2004), 
patent data also helps to characterize the extent to which each inventor is a generalist (or, as we will 
refer from now on, his knowledge breadth). Empirical results point out that variety generated by the 
presence of generalists has a positive impact on the relevance of the innovation and that this effect 
is mediated by an increased level of invention originality.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
                                                             
3
 In a different strand of literature, and from a firm-level perspective, Gompers et al. (2009) make an 
analogous exercise by linking the performance of venture capital firms to their degree of specialization and 
that of their professionals. According to their findings, generalist venture capital firms obtain superior 
performance when the individual investment professionals that they employ are highly specialized. 
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The innovation process can be divided into three consecutive phases: knowledge recombination, 
selection of ideas and adoption (Simonton, 1999; Singh and Fleming, 2010). The quality of the 
result depends crucially on the first two stages, when inventors try different ways of combining 
existing pieces of knowledge to create some novel technology and select the best alternative. Past 
research on group diversity and creativity suggests that groups enjoy more room for recombination 
and more alternative paths to solve problems when they combine a more varied knowledge set 
(Paulus, 2000; Stasson and Bradshaw, 1995; Jackson, 1996). In accordance with this idea, Singh 
and Fleming (2010) find that teams of inventors outperform solo inventors, partly because of their 
higher knowledge variety. Nevertheless, knowledge variety may generate a series of team 
malfunctions, during both the recombination and the idea-selection phases. These obstacles include 
communication problems that arise when team members use different technical jargons (Maznevski, 
1994), conflicts that may occur when members feel strongly committed to their diverse perspectives 
(Levine and Thompson, 1996), and free-riding problems that are specially acute if teammates 
cannot easily evaluate their colleagues‘ contributions. The balance of advantages and difficulties 
generated by knowledge variety depends on how this variety is achieved in the group, as Rulke and 
Galaskiewicz (2000) suggest. In the particular case of teams of inventors, we expect that the 
inclusion of generalist inventors in a team enhances the above-mentioned advantages and 
diminishes the malfunctions, leading to more relevant and more original innovations. Below we 
develop the arguments that support this thesis.  
 
Relevance of the Innovation 
Knowledge recombination. Innovations are often described as the result of a process where 
existing technologies are recombined in a novel way (Schumpeter, 1939; Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). By its very nature, this process of 
recombination is carried out more effectively when at least one head can fit most of the relevant 
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pieces of knowledge together. Conversely, if each of the different pieces needed for recombination 
is held by different inventors, the amount and the quality of the interconnections that can be 
established between these separate portions of information is limited by communication constraints. 
In terms of Fleming and Sorenson‘s (2001) technological landscape concept, the big picture of the 
landscape that a generalist has in mind enables him to conduct a more effective search than that 
performed by different specialists stitching several small sections of this same landscape. Moreover, 
in a team setting, a broad individual knowledge background will entail more overlapping expertise 
among the inventors. Given that, in group discussions, shared information is more likely to be 
retrieved than unshared information (Stasser and Titus, 1985; Rulke and Galaskiewcz, 2000), the 
potential for collaborative knowledge recombination in a team will increase with the presence of 
generalists.  
As Jones (2009) remarks, a broad-knowledge human capital background can only be built at 
the expense of knowledge depth4. Thus, generalists contribute less deep knowledge to their 
innovation teams than do specialist co-inventors with a comparable amount of experience. 
Nevertheless, the process of innovation by knowledge recombination does not require one to be at 
the frontier of knowledge in all the relevant areas. Recombination consists of mingling—for the 
first time or in a new way—old ideas or principles from different domains. That is, a novel 
combination of technologies A and B may be able to expand the frontier of knowledge even if 
neither technology A nor B represents the frontier in their respective fields.  
                                                             
4 Obviously, there is a minimum knowledge depth that an inventor must achieve in each area in order to be 
able to use it for recombination. We understand a generalist inventor as someone with knowledge depth 
above that minimum in each of the considered areas. In our empirical study, such minimum depth is 
guaranteed by the measure of an inventor’s knowledge background, which is based on previous innovation 
experiences. 
8 
 
Therefore, broad knowledge is a more valuable asset for recombination than deep 
knowledge. This implies that teams including generalists can be expected to outperform teams of 
specialists in the use of knowledge variety to conceive high-potential ideas. 
 
Communication. Effective communication is a concern for any working group, and innovation 
teams are no exception. Communication issues are important for the processes of idea generation, 
enrichment and selection. Team members with different specialized knowledge often speak 
different jargons, hampering the gains from diversity (Maznevski, 1994). This argument has been 
frequently used to explain non-monotonic (inverted-U shape) effects of skill diversity on 
performance (Laursen et al., 2005; Giuri et al., 2009). Nonetheless, these communication problems 
are likely to lessen with the presence of generalists in the team. Since teams that include generalists 
in their ranks are more likely to have overlapping knowledge among their members, they will 
benefit from shared codes of communication. Not only will generalists have more fluent dialogues 
with overlapping co-inventors, but they will facilitate the dialogue between specialist team-mates 
by building communication bridges among them. The existence of a common language is an 
important enabling factor in order to share knowledge and harness the potential benefits of 
knowledge variety. Therefore, we expect that teams with generalist inventors will suffer less from 
communication problems, one of the main obstacles that hinder the gains from knowledge variety. 
 
Conflict. A related issue has to do with the conflicts that may arise among co-inventors in a team. 
Although some level of group conflict may stimulate creativity, high-intensity conflicts are strongly 
dysfunctional (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Groups that gather 
heterogeneous knowledge may have especially high levels of internal conflict if their members have 
strong feelings about their diverse perspectives (Paulus, 2000; Levine and Thompson 1996). This is 
especially likely if members are field specialists. Firstly, generalist co-inventors are more likely to 
have some overlapping knowledge that makes it easier for them to understand the scope of co-
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inventors‘ critiques. Secondly, inventors with a more diversified background are less likely to suffer 
from a ―myopic‖ view that leads to inflexibility in discussions. Both arguments suggest that teams 
of inventors whose knowledge variety is based on specialists are more likely to suffer strong, 
dysfunctional conflicts while teams including generalists will be more likely to keep conflict 
intensity at the moderate level at which it may have a positive effect on performance (Jehn and 
Mannix, 2001). 
 
Free riding. Free riding is a problem of incentives that occurs in working groups when individual 
members‘ contributions to the collective output cannot be measured separately. Group members, 
then, may exert less effort because any expected reward to their contribution has to be shared with 
the rest of group members. Free-riding may particularly affect innovative teams by decreasing the 
quality of ideas they generate (Wageman, 1995; Diehl and Stroebe, 1987; Girotra et al., 2010). The 
same rationale applies to the effort exerted in the other phases of the innovation process, i.e. 
screening and enriching teammates‘ ideas. One significant way to curb free riding is through peer 
pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). If group members can mutually monitor their effort, they will 
put pressure on each other in order to keep performance high. Knowledge variety in teams of 
inventors may play against mutual monitoring -and therefore against peer pressure- if it takes the 
form of field specialists, because they will not be able to evaluate each others‘ effort. In contrast, 
the presence of some generalist researchers makes it possible to exert the peer pressure needed to 
counteract free-riding. 
 In sum, teams of inventors that reach a high level of knowledge variety thanks to the 
inclusion of some generalist members in their ranks are expected to perform better than those that 
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include different field specialists only. The reason is that such teams are better at recombining 
knowledge and dealing with conflicts, communication, and free-riding problems.5 
 
Hypothesis 1: Teams of inventors that obtain knowledge variety through the inclusion of generalist 
members generate innovations of greater relevance than teams that achieve variety through field 
specialists. 
Originality of the Innovation 
Innovation can result either from exploitation of existing ideas or from exploration of new 
paradigms. The first approach to innovation is more likely to result in incremental ideas, whereas 
the latter is more likely to produce more original output. We argue that the presence of generalists 
in a team will favour exploration over exploitation and this will have consequences for the 
originality of the innovation. As mentioned earlier, generalists make the recombination of ideas in a 
team more effective. As we argue below, they also have the ability to manage recombination in a 
more creative way.  
Original ideas often result from applying mental operations such as analogies or re-
organization of categories to knowledge structures previously stored in memory (Ward, 2004). If a 
large part of the relevant key ideas and concepts are uniquely stored in specialist team members‘ 
memories, the creation process is expected to be less fruitful in terms of originality. The reason is 
that the retrieval of information in knowledge-sharing meetings, on which teams of specialists rely 
crucially for knowledge recombination, usually takes the form of specific examples and 
applications rather than abstract concepts. This particular representation of information creates an 
                                                             
5 There are a number of factors that may affect team effectiveness in the innovation process but that have 
not been considered for the development of our hypothesis. These include cognitive and social issues such 
as production blocking, social apprehension and illusion of productivity. Despite the relevance that these 
processes have for creativity in innovation teams (Paulus, 2000; Girotra et al., 2010), we do not include them 
in the discussion because they do not clearly relate to team composition. 
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anchoring effect that leads to incremental, less original innovations (Ward, 1994, 2004). 
Conversely, the presence of generalists in a team makes it possible to consider more abstract pieces 
of knowledge in the recombination process. First, as individuals, their higher knowledge breadth 
provides them with more room for analogies and re-organization involving abstract elements. In this 
vein -although in a different context-, Shane (2000) shows that entrepreneurs with broad prior 
knowledge are more likely to conceive novel ways of representing the market and discover 
entrepreneurial opportunities than their narrow-knowledge counterparts. Second, teams with a 
greater presence of generalists enjoy more overlapping expertise, which enables researchers to 
exchange ideas in more abstract terms and avoid the aforementioned anchoring effect.  
We also argue that originality is conducive to greater relevance of the innovation. By 
unlocking new ways of approaching technological solutions, original innovations open up a way for 
subsequent creative efforts and applications. Ahuja and Lampert (2001) find that, at the firm level, 
the originality of innovations is linked to the number of industry breakthroughs produced by the 
firm. This implies that original innovations generate an option value, allowing for the development 
of further innovations based on them. In a similar vein, Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) find that 
innovations that result from ―radical‖ exploration, i.e. that build upon knowledge that spans firm 
and technology boundaries, have higher impact on subsequent research. Thus, more original 
innovations are expected to be more relevant for the scientific community.  
Since teams with a larger presence of generalist inventors engender more original 
innovations, and more original innovations are expected to be more relevant than less original ones, 
it follows that originality of the innovation is a mediating variable in the relationship between team 
composition and the relevance of the innovation. On the other hand, the lower communication, 
conflict and free riding costs that teams with generalists enjoy enhance the final quality of the 
innovation, independently of the originality of the idea behind it. Therefore, the argument that 
teams that harness knowledge variety through generalist inventors benefit from reduced costs of 
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motivation and coordination holds for any level of originality of the new knowledge. In other 
words, originality only partially mediates the effect of the presence of generalists on the relevance 
of the innovation. 
 
Hypothesis2: The positive effect of team knowledge variety obtained through the inclusion of 
generalist inventors on the relevance of the resulting innovation is partially mediated by the 
originality of such innovation. 
  
3. Data, Variables and Methods 
Data Overview 
We use patent data to identify the creative output of teams of inventors. Patents are instruments 
used by firms to protect their innovations and are widely used in some industries, such as chemicals 
and electronics. Moreover, the majority of innovations patented in recent decades are the product of 
teamwork (Singh and Fleming, 2010).  
In particular, we retrieve patent data from the NBER Patent Citations Data File (Hall et al., 
2001), which contains data on all US patents granted from 1970 up to 1999. This dataset contains, 
for each patent, a set of information of interest to our analysis: 1) the names of the inventors who 
worked on the underlying innovation, which are considered to form the team responsible for it 
(Jones, 2009; Singh & Fleming, 2010), 2) its classification into a technological domain, and 3) the 
citations it received from subsequent patents, which is an indicator of the relevance of the patent 
(see next subsection). With all this information, we are able to identify the knowledge background 
of each inventor who participates in a team innovation (by tracking them across their previous 
patents) as well as the technological impact of this innovation. In order to have a reliable historical 
record for each inventor, we only analyze team patents from 1985 to 1999.  
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We restrict our analysis to patents granted in the electrical and electronics industry, one of 
the sectors in which firms are especially likely to patent every improvement they achieve (Hall, 
2004). This sample restriction means that we capture a high fraction of all the innovations in this 
sector, greatly reducing the selection bias of considering only patented innovations. Moreover, it 
allows for a meaningful characterization of the inventors‘ background, since it is very likely that 
any work in this sector by a given inventor is captured in a patent. In order to further ensure that we 
meet these two objectives, we confine our analysis to patents filed by inventors located in the US 
(inventors located outside the US are likely to be more selective in patenting in the USPTO). Since 
we are interested in teams and their variety, we restrict our analysis to patents co-invented by a 
team, i.e. by at least 2 inventors, and assigned to a firm. This leaves an eligible sample of 60,242 
teams of inventors, located in the US, who applied for a patent in the electrical and electronics 
category (as defined by Hall et al., 2001) during the period 1985 to 1999. Nevertheless, the final 
sample we work with is further restricted, for two reasons. First, in order to characterize the 
knowledge background of team members, we need that at least one of them has some previous 
experience. Second, since we rely on a firm fixed-effect approach for our estimations, we require 
that each firm6 appears at least twice in the sample and contributes with some within-firm variation. 
These restrictions produce a final sample of 39,894 teams from 1,987 firms.  
Using patent data to analyze the composition and performance of teams of inventors has 
several limitations. First of all, tracking inventors‘ patenting history requires making some 
assumptions as to when two coincident names can be considered the same person (Trajtenberg et 
al., 2006). Our study relies on the most stringent criterion by which both inventor name and 
assignee affiliation must coincide, but results hold under more naïve matching criteria as well.  
                                                             
6 We identify the firm employing each team of inventors by using the “assignee” code of each patent, which 
refers to the legal entity that applies for and owns it. The assignee code typically identifies the employer 
firm, although sometimes it identifies different subsidiaries or establishments of a larger firm separately. 
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Secondly, we do not have information regarding the exact contribution of each co-inventor to each 
innovation. Although all the individuals responsible for any significant contribution have to be 
included in the list of inventors to avoid legal problems (Klee, 1998), patents may occasionally 
include some ―guest‖ author as well (e.g., the director of the lab) with no real contribution to the 
innovation (Lissoni and Montobbio, 2008). These issues may generate some measurement error 
leading to an attenuation bias in the estimation of effects in our empirical analysis. 
 
Key Variables of the Analysis 
Relevance of the innovation. We measure the relevance of the innovation with the number of 
citations received by the focal patent from subsequent patents. The logic behind this measure is that 
that every patented innovation must cite the previous patents upon which it builds. Patents with 
more citations represent innovations that have contributed more to the technological development, 
and this is correlated with its economic performance in the market as well (Henderson et al., 1998; 
Jaffe et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2005). 
 
Team knowledge variety. We measure team knowledge variety with the number of primary 
technological areas in which team members have patented in the past. Patents are assigned to 
technological categories. The larger the number of different areas in which at least one team 
member worked in the past, the greater the team knowledge variety. Innovations patented at the 
USPTO are classified into 416 technological classes (as of 1999) that Hall et al. (2001) group into 
36 narrower subcategories. We consider these two alternative levels of aggregation to identify 
technological areas: class and subcategory. The narrow scope of patent-class grouping minimizes 
the chances of understating the real knowledge variety. On the other hand, the broader scope of the 
subcategory level avoids overstating the team knowledge variety (if two or more classes actually 
represent the same technological area), but may fail to consider the technological heterogeneity that 
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may exist within a given subcategory. Singh and Fleming (2010) use the number of different 
technological classes in which team members patented in the past to capture knowledge variety7. 
 
Average individual knowledge breadth. Analogously, in order to capture the breadth of the 
knowledge held by individual co-inventors, we average across team members the number of classes 
(and also the number of subcategories) in which each of them has experience. A large average 
number of areas of expertise indicates that the average inventor of the team has a broader 
knowledge background, i.e. that he is more of a generalist. Note that team knowledge variety and 
individual breadth are highly correlated (correlation coefficients are 0.87 and 0.89 for number of 
classes and number of subcategories, respectively). This correlation has a particular feature: average 
individual breadth is a lower bound for team variety. In other words, teams of inventors can attain 
knowledge variety either through specialized contributions or through the participation of 
generalists.  
 
Originality. To determine how original a patented innovation is, we use the Originality index 
proposed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and implemented by Hall et al. (2001), which is a dispersion 
index of the citations made in the patent document to prior art across different classes. In particular, 
the index takes the following form:  
Originalityi = 1-  
                                                             
7 Marx et al. (2009), Gompers et al. (2009) and Grober et al. (2008) use Herfindahl concentration indexes to 
capture team variety. Although Herfindahl-based measures are sensitive to the amount of experience held 
in each different field, they pose some problems that advise against their use in this study. First, the effect of 
a change in the Herfindahl index is relatively more difficult to interpret in the context of regression analysis 
than the effect of one additional area of expertise. More importantly, to compute unbiased Herfindahl 
indexes it is necessary to consider only inventors with two or more patents in their history (Hall et al. 2001), 
which can seriously bias the working sample.  
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where sij is the percentage of the citations made by patent i that belong to patent class j out of J 
patent classes (J=416). Thus, the index takes high values when the focal patent cites prior art in a 
wide range of fields and low values otherwise. This originality measure has been widely used in 
studies using patent data (e. g. Gompers et al., 2005; Palomeras, 2007; Lerner et al. 2011; Valentini, 
2011). It is based on the idea that original innovations tend to synthesize knowledge from a number 
of different technologies that are used as building blocks. Arthur (2007) describes examples of 
inventions such as the xerography, the atomic bomb or the laser that meet this definition. 
 
Control Variables 
Number of inventors. We control for the number of inventors who constitute the team responsible 
for the focal patent, since it may reflect the complexity of the underlying project as well as the 
amount of resources devoted to it, and both factors may affect the resulting output. We also 
introduce the square of this variable to account for non-linear effects. 
 
Average members’ expertise. We control for the mean number of previous patents filed by the 
inventors working in the team of the focal patent (up to the year they filed the focal patent), in order 
to reflect the amount of expertise of the average inventor in the team. 
 
Asymmetry in members’ expertise. We also control for the asymmetry in the distribution of 
expertise across team members, since the presence of one or more ‗star inventors‘ may particularly 
affect the relevance of the innovation and could confound the effects of team and individual 
knowledge variety. We capture the asymmetry in team members‘ expertise with the standard 
deviation of their number of previous patents.  
 
Average quality of members’ expertise. The quality of team members‘ past work may be related 
to the quality of their subsequent work, since it may reflect the inventors‘ underlying ability. 
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Therefore, we control for the average number of forward citations received by previous patents in 
which team members of the focal patent participated. In particular, we use standardized citations 
received8 in order to take account of time effects that affect the number of citations received by a 
patent. The number of previous patents filed by team members and their average quality are 
especially important control variables. To the extent that they capture the quantity and quality of 
team members‘ human capital, they are potentially relevant confounding factors that must be taken 
into account in our analysis. 
 
Average number of past co-inventors. We average across team members the mean number of co-
authors with which each of them worked in his previous patents, in order to adjust for the effect of 
their previous expertise.  
 
Average tenure of team members. We take into account the mean tenure of team members, 
computed as the number of years in which each inventor has been patenting with the firm (based on 
the application year of their first patent and that of the focal patent).  
 
Technological area effects. There are differences in the propensity to be cited across different 
technological areas and sub-areas that could be related to differences in the structure of teams of 
inventors. We control for the technological class in which the patent falls within the Electrical and 
Electronics category, which is the focus of our analysis.  
 
Time effects. We use a set of dummy variables to control for the year in which the patent is applied 
for, since time heavily affects the prospect for citations: as Hall et al. (2001) note, an older patent 
has a longer time span to be cited than a more recent patent.  
                                                             
8 The standardization, as proposed by Hall et al (2001), consists of adjusting the citations received by a 
patent by the mean citations received by the population of patents applied for in the same year and 
technological category 
18 
 
 
 
 
Methods 
We use the negative binomial regression model to estimate the effect of team composition on team 
performance. Given that our dependent variable (number of citations received by subsequent 
patents) is a count variable presenting overdispersion, this is the most appropriate model to test 
Hypothesis 1 (Hausman et al, 1984). This model also allows a fixed-effect version to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. This is something extremely appropriate for analyzing our data, which 
suffers from potentially important unobserved firm-level effects.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we apply the three-steps procedure established by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) to test mediation, which is particularly appropriate when analyzing large samples like 
the one studied in this article (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). To establish the mediating role of 
originality of the innovation on the relationship between team members‘ knowledge breadth and the 
relevance of the innovation, three conditions must hold. First, the presence of inventors with broad 
knowledge must have a positive impact on the originality of the innovation; second, the originality 
of the innovation must affect its relevance even when the members‘ knowledge breadth is 
controlled for; and third, the estimated effect of members‘ knowledge breadth on the relevance of 
the innovation is significantly smaller when originality is controlled for (with respect to the effect in 
the non-mediated model used to test Hypothesis 1). 
 
4. Results 
The descriptive statistics of the main variables corresponding to the sample used in the regression 
are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 2 presents the results of the negative binomial regression model with firm fixed-
effects. The first four rows display the effect of team knowledge variety and average individual 
knowledge breadth for the two alternative levels of aggregation: technological classes and 
subcategories. The particular specification of our regression model has important consequences for 
the interpretation of the effects of team knowledge variety and average knowledge breadth. Given 
that we also control for the total number of patents filed in the past by co-inventors, the effect of an 
increase in the number of areas in which the team has experience (team variety), is also associated 
with a lower level of experience in some of them. Similarly, the effect of an increase in the average 
individual number of areas of expertise (average individual breadth) is necessarily associated with 
fewer specialized contributions. Columns (1) and (3) show the estimated effect of team variety on 
citations received when the average knowledge breadth of individual members is not controlled for. 
In both cases the estimated impact is positive and, for the number of classes, significant. According 
to Columns (2) and (4), the effect decreases to negative non-significant levels when the presence of 
generalists is taken into account. On the other hand, the effect of higher average individual 
knowledge breadth is positive and significant for both levels of field aggregation. Keeping all other 
things constant, a one-unit increase in members‘ average number of classes is associated with a 
2.36% increase in expected citations received (exp{0.0233}=1.0236). Similarly, a one-unit increase 
in members‘ average number of subcategories is associated with a 3.66% increase in expected 
citations received (exp{0.0359}=1.0366). These findings provide support for Hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, the fact that team variety does not have a significant impact on citations received once 
we control for average individual breadth suggests that only the variety contributed by members 
with some generalist background is beneficial for the relevance of the innovation. Most of the 
important control variables in Table 2 show effects in the expected direction. Members‘ expertise in 
terms of quantity and quality of past patents has a positive effect on citations received, the number 
of inventors has a positive but decreasing effect, while the mean number of past co-inventors and 
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the mean tenure both have a negative effect. Surprisingly, the asymmetry in team members‘ 
expertise also has a negative effect on the citations received by the patent, questioning the idea that 
one superstar inventor is particularly relevant for the success of an innovation project (Gruber et al. 
2008).  
Tables 3 and 4 present the analysis on the mediating role of the originality of the innovation 
proposed in Hypothesis 2. The first part of the test intends to assess whether our relevant 
independent variable has an effect on the mediator (Table 3). The results of the fixed-effects 
regression analysis, which includes the same set of control variables used for testing Hypothesis 1, 
reveals that the originality of the invention increases with the inclusion of generalist members.9 
Table 4 presents the results of the second step of the mediation analysis. Columns (1) and 
(3) replicate the results presented in Table 2 to test Hypothesis 1. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4 
present the same specification with the addition of Originality as an independent variable explaining 
the relevance of the innovation. As expected, the originality of the innovation has a significant 
positive effect on the number of citations received. Furthermore, the effect of team-members‘ 
average knowledge breadth—both in terms of technological classes and subcategories—drops by 
about 10% when we account for the originality of the innovation. We test the statistical significance 
of this change by bootstrapping the sample 500 times and directly estimating the distribution of the 
difference in coefficients. The results show that the difference in the estimated coefficient across 
specifications is statistically significant at the 1% level for both technological classes and 
subcategories. Therefore, we find support for Hypothesis 2, that is, the advantage of obtaining 
                                                             
9 Since the Originality score used as dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, fractional response 
regression methods could seem more appropriate than the linear regression used here (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 2008). We prefer the linear approach because it is the only way to eliminate firm fixed-effects 
without making assumptions about them. However, the results of the fractional probit regression with 
correlated random effects suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) yielded very similar results to those of 
Table 3. 
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knowledge variety with the contribution of generalists is partially mediated by the originality of the 
innovation. That the mediation effect is only partial is clear from the fact that the direct effect of 
members‘ average knowledge breadth remains significant after controlling for originality and still 
accounts for 90% of the total effect.  
  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this article, we argue that the source of knowledge variety in teams of inventors has an effect on 
their performance. In particular, we propose that teams that achieve variety based on generalists 
outperform those based on field specialists alone. The reason is that generalists are more effective in 
the recombination of knowledge and suffer less from some typical group process barriers such as 
communication problems, excessive conflict and free-riding issues. We test this idea using data on 
patents from teams of inventors.  
In line with our predictions, the empirical analysis shows that innovations patented by 
teams with high knowledge variety receive more citations from subsequent patents if the average 
individual knowledge variety of its members is also high. High team knowledge variety has no 
statistically significant effect on the relevance of the innovation if combined with low average 
individual knowledge breadth. We also find that the effect of generalists is partially mediated by the 
originality of the innovation. This mediating role of originality, however, accounts for a relatively 
low share of the total effect of members‘ knowledge breadth. In our theoretical framework, we 
propose the originality of the innovation as a mediating variable because the presence of generalists 
is expected to enable better knowledge recombination across technological boundaries, hence 
overcoming local search and obtaining more radical innovations. Reversing the arguments, our 
results suggest that the added value of generalist members is to a larger extent a result of better 
communication, less free-riding and fewer conflicts and to a lesser extent the product of better 
recombination.  
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Our findings are apparently in conflict with the thesis of Jones (2009), who claims that the 
increasing use of teams in scientific research is the consequence of narrowing expertise which, in 
turn, is the consequence of the increasing complexity of knowledge. This ―death of the Renaissance 
Man‖ argument is not easy to reconcile with our findings that generalist-based teams generate 
innovations of greater relevance than do specialist-based teams. One possible reason behind this 
paradox can be found in the cost function: if investing in a generalist background is costly enough 
to cancel the benefits from the expected increase in the value of the output, it would be more 
economical to base team knowledge variety on specialized contributions. In any case, our results 
suggest that a new type of ―Renaissance Man‖ is needed to extract the full potential of knowledge 
variety in innovation teams. Otherwise, the limited scope for knowledge recombination and the 
motivation and coordination problems that arise in a working group may result in knowledge 
variety being a liability rather than an asset. 
Our study has several implications. First of all, it pinpoints that knowledge variety in teams 
is not necessarily obtained by gathering different field specialists, but it can also be reached with the 
inclusion of some generalist members. More importantly, our investigation shows that, in the 
context of the generation of innovations, teams with generalist members actually outperform teams 
that combine specialists. The extent to which this result can be generalized to teams in other 
contexts crucially depends on the interconnections between the different pieces of expertise that the 
team task requires. Teams in which members‘ pieces of expertise are applied in isolation or are 
connected in a standard way (e.g. the cabin crew of an airplane), may profit more from the deep 
knowledge attained by field specialists. On the contrary, teams involved in the generation of new 
knowledge, whose success strongly depends on how the existing building blocks are blended, will 
benefit most from the presence of generalist members. 
To conclude, note that we frame our discussion of generalist versus specialist inventors at 
the group level, capturing it empirically with an aggregate indicator of mean individual knowledge 
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variety. However, a single generalist in the team may be enough to centralize the process of 
knowledge recombination, to effectively monitor teammates or to facilitate the solution of conflicts 
and communication problems. Such a ―Jack of all Technologies‖ (Gruber et al. 2008) may have an 
analogous function to that of the ―Jack of all Trades‖ manager in the business environment (Lazear, 
2004), with special emphasis on managing the knowledge recombination and coordinating and 
controlling group processes. Further research should address the particular effect of the existence of 
such a generalist coordinator and develop a methodology to measure the impact of his presence in a 
team of inventors. 
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Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
 
Citations Received by the focal patent 
 
4.9631 
 
8.1647 
 
0 
 
158 
 
 Originality of the focal patent 
 
Team Variety:  
          Number of classes 
0.4038 
 
 
3.4576 
0.2732 
 
 
3.1079 
0 
 
 
1 
0.93 
 
 
44 
  
          Number of sub-categories 
           
Members’ Breadth:          
 
2.7047 
 
2.0356 
 
1 
 
17 
          Mean number of classes 1.7371 1.5917 0.0833 29.67 
           
          Mean number of sub-categories 
 
1.4392 
 
1.1407 
 
0.0833 
 
13.66 
 
 
Number of Inventors 
 
 
2.9238 
 
 
1.2695 
 
 
2 
 
 
23 
 
Members’ Expertise: Mean number of previous patents 
 
4.3136 
 
6.9652 
 
0.0833 
 
149 
 
Asymmetry of Expertise: Standard deviation of previous of patents 
 
3.9062 
 
6.6092 
 
0 
 
137.18 
     
Mean number of past Co-inventors 
 
2.6952 1.1746 1 34 
Members’ Quality: Mean number of the citations received by the 
patents of team members 
 
1.6318 1.6154 0 48.12 
N=39894  
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Table 2: Team composition and the value of innovations. Negative binomial 
regression, firm fixed-effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
  
VARIABLES 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
     
  Team Variety:  
 
          Number of classes 
 
 
0.0060** 
(0.0024) 
 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0045) 
   
            Number of sub-categories 
           
Members’ Breadth:          
  0.0053 
(0.0035) 
-0.0096 
(0.0063) 
 
            
          Mean number of classes 
  
0.0233** 
(0.0097) 
  
   
 
 
           Mean number of sub-categories           0.0359*** 
(0.0128) 
 
 
 Number of inventors 0.0653*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0727*** 
(0.0128) 
  0.0669*** 
(0.0124) 
 0.0761*** 
(0.0129) 
 
 
 Number of inventors squared -0.0029** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0031** 
(0.0013) 
 
  
Members’ expertise: Mean number of 
previous patents 
 
 0.0075*** 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0044** 
(0.0021) 
 
 0.0082*** 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0047*** 
(0.0020) 
 
  
Asymmetry of members’ expertise: 
S.D. of number of previous patents 
 
-0.0060*** 
(0.0016) 
 
-0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
 
-0.0057*** 
      (0.0016) 
 
-0.0034* 
(0.0018) 
 
  
Members’ quality: Mean number of 
citations received by their patents. 
 
0.0861*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0861*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0860*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0862*** 
(0.0024) 
 
  
Mean number of past co-inventors 
 
-0.0323*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0334*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0339*** 
(0.0050) 
 
  
Mean tenure 
 
-0.0098*** 
 
-0.0102*** 
 
-0.0093*** 
 
-0.0100*** 
 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)  
 Constant 0.3060*** 0.2887*** 0.299*** 0.278***  
  (0.0475) (0.0481) (0.0474) (0.0480)  
 Observations 39,894 39,894 39,894 39,894  
 Number of firms 1,987 1,987 1,987 1,987  
       
Notes: Year and technological class dummies included as controls in all specifications. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Mediation Analysis I: Does members’ average knowledge breadth affect 
originality of the innovation? Firm fixed-effects Linear regression.  
 
  (1) (2)  
  
VARIABLES 
Originality 
index 
Originality 
Index 
 
 
  Team Variety:  
 
          Number of classes 
 
 
0.0064*** 
(0.0012) 
  
            Number of sub-categories 
           
Members’ Breadth:          
 0.0110*** 
(0.0017) 
 
            
          Mean number of classes 
 
0.0127*** 
(0.0026) 
  
           Mean number of sub-categories  0.0166*** 
(0.0033) 
 
  
Number of inventors 
 
0.0121*** 
(0.0032) 
 
0.0119*** 
(0.0032) 
 
  
Number of inventors squared 
 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
 
  
Members’ expertise: Mean number of 
previous patents 
 
-0.0035*** 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0005) 
 
  
Asymmetry of members’ expertise: 
S.D. of number of previous patents 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
 
  
Members’ quality: Mean number of 
citations received by their patents. 
 
0.0051*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0051*** 
(0.0010) 
 
  
Mean number of past coinventors 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0013) 
 
  
Mean tenure 
 
-0.0010** 
 
-0.0012** 
 
  (0.0005) (0.0005)  
 Constant 0.2890*** 0.2778***  
  (0.0130) (0.0130)  
     
 Observations 39,425 39,425  
 Number of firms 1,985 1,985  
Notes: Year and technological class dummies included as controls in all 
specifications. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Mediation Analysis II: Does controlling for originality affect the effect of 
members’ average knowledge breadth on the value of the innovation?  
Negative binomial regression with firm fixed-effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
  
VARIABLES 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
Citations 
received 
count 
 
  Team Variety:  
 
          Number of classes 
 
 
-0.0029 
(0.0045) 
 
 
-0.0030 
(0.0045) 
   
            Number of sub-categories 
           
Members’ Breadth:          
  -0.0096 
(0.0063) 
-0.0095 
(0.064) 
 
 
            
          Mean number of classes 
 
0.0233** 
(0.0097) 
 
0.0208** 
(0.0098) 
   
           Mean number of sub-categories   0.0359*** 
(0.0128) 
0.0322** 
(0.0128) 
 
  
Originality 
  
0.0659*** 
(0.0189) 
    
 0.0672*** 
(0.0189) 
 
  
Number of inventors 
 
0.0727*** 
(0.0128) 
 
0.0703*** 
(0.0128) 
 
0.0761*** 
(0.0129) 
 
0.0735*** 
(0.0128) 
 
  
Number of inventors squared 
 
-0.0030** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0029** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0031** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0029** 
(0.0013) 
 
  
Members’ expertise: Mean number of 
previous patents 
 
0.0044** 
(0.0021) 
 
0.0049** 
(0.0021) 
 
0.0047*** 
(0.0020) 
 
0.0052*** 
(0.0020) 
 
  
Asymmetry of members’ expertise: 
S.D. of number of previous patents 
 
-0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
 
-0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
 
-0.0034* 
(0.0018) 
 
-0.0034* 
(0.0018) 
 
  
Members’ quality: Mean number of 
citations received by their patents. 
 
0.0861*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0861*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0862*** 
(0.0024) 
 
0.0861*** 
(0.0024) 
 
  
Mean number of past coinventors 
 
-0.0334*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0330*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0339*** 
(0.0050) 
 
-0.0335*** 
(0.0051) 
 
  
Mean tenure 
 
-0.0102*** 
 
-0.0100*** 
 
-0.0100*** 
 
-0.0976*** 
 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)  
 Constant 0.2887*** 0.2733*** 0.278*** 0.263***  
  (0.0481) (0.0486) (0.0480) (0.0485)  
 Observations 39,894 39,417 39,894 39,417  
 Number of firms 1,987 1,978 1,987 1,978  
Notes: Year and technological class dummies included as controls in all specifications. Standard errors in 
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parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
